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THE PRESENT
ANTITRUST
JUNGLE
G. WILLIAM TRIVOLI*
U NTIL RECENT YEARS, the prevailing attitude toward antitrust could be
characterized as quite favorable but that it lacked either necessary
moral or financial support. However, this opinion has almost completely
changed. Lawyers and economists specializing in antitrust, who were once
enthusiastic supporters, now have become critical of both the law and its
enforcement.'
John Kenneth Galbraith's characterization of antitrust as a "charade"
is being heeded by more observers.2 What appears to be the reason for
this shift in feeling regarding antitrust? How did antitrust policy get
into its present state? And, most importantly, how may antitrust be
rescued from this dilemma?
This article is a modest attempt to examine the above questions.
First, a brief review of the historical framework of antitrust is presented
to gain some perspective of the present problems. Second, there is a brief
review of the legal and economic concepts of monopoly. Next, there
is a brief discussion of two important unresolved issues of antitrust,
conglomerate mergers and economic concentration. Finally, several
recommendations are made for changes and improvements in antitrust
to make it more effective and less cumbersome.
THE HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK OF ANTITRUST POLICY
Americans traditionally have been suspicious of restraint of trade and
monopoly power. It is no surprise that during a period generally charac-
terized as pro-business, the United States Congress passed the primer
antitrust statute, the Sherman Antitrust Act.3 The law merely made what
had been previously an offense under common law, a federal offense.
* Associate Professor of Finance, University of Akron, Department of Finance,
College of Business Administration. B.S., Grove City College; M.B.A., Duquesne
University; Ph.D., University of Virginia.
1 Dewey, The Shaky Case for Antitrust, CHALLENGE, Jan.-Feb. 1966, at 17.
2 J. K. Galbraith, "Are Planning and Regulation Replacing Competition in the New
Industrial State?" Hearing, of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, onPlanning, Regulation, and Competition Before Subcommission, 90th Cong. Ist Sess.
(1967).
3 Sherman Anti-trust Act §§1, 2, 15 U.S.C. §§1, 2 (1890), as amended 15 U.S.C.
§§1, 2 (1955).
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Framers of the Sherman Act and the majority of Congress voting for its
passage were not behaving inconsistently. One can be basically in favor of
industry yet opposed to restraints of trade and the ills of monopoly.
The major departure of the Sherman Act from common law was to
convert treatment of contracts in restraint of trade as null and void by the
courts into a federal offense and provide for specific penalties or remedies.
The statute's fundamental purpose was both clear to the originators and
has been to most observers-that purpose being to "(1) prevent the
exercise and growth of monopoly, and (2) retain as far as possible, and
restore, the business practices of free entry and price competition."
4
Despite general agreement on the basic purpose of the Sherman Act,
there has been great uncertainty and disagreement with respect to the
Act's interpretation and enforcement. Confusion over the interpretation
and the policies which should guide the law's application has led a number
of scholars to determine that the original legislative intent and policy of
-the Sherman Act has not been followed. One such study is by Robert H.
Bork of the Yale Law School. Following an exhaustive study of the
Congressional Record, Professor Bork concluded: "... Congress intended
the courts to implement... that value we would today call consumer
welfare... . " It is Bork's feeling that since the legislative history of the
Sherman Act showed consumer welfare to be the decisive value in
weighing injury, it should therefore be treated by the courts as the only
value.6 The basic problem with the vaguely phrased Sherman Act, Bork
believes, is that the federal courts have never arrived at a definitive
statement of values or policies which should control the law's application
and evolution.
Professor Bork maintains that the Rule of Reason, originally
enunciated by Chief Justice White in the 1911 Standard Oil 7 and
American Tobacco s opinions, was the most faithful reflection of Senator
Sherman's and his colleagues' policy intentions. Bork points out that:
There was in White's opinions, as in Sherman's speeches, the idea
that the statute was concerned exclusively with consumer welfare
and that this meant the law must discourage restriction of output
wihout hampering efficiency.9
The Rule of Reason, which regards only unreasonable restraints of
trade as unlawful, is considered by Bork as completely in keeping with
4 V. A. MUND, GOVERNMENT AND BusINESS 101 (4th ed. 1965).
5 Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 6 J. LAW & ECON. 7
(1966).
61d. at 11.
7 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
8 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
9 Bork, supra note 5, at 47.
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the concept of consumer welfare. Moreover, Mr. Justice White provides a
useful and workable policy guide to control the law's future application as
well as its evolution. The court, in applying the Rule of Reason, was to
first consider the impact of the merger on market structure, and second
examine the particular situation in light of the factual showing of
illegality.' 0
By application of the Sherman Test, Mr. Justice White not only
incorporated into the Rule of Reason the major rules of law which
Sherman envisaged as implied by a consumer-welfare policy, but also
allowed for the future implementation of increased knowledge of business
concentration and improved economic analysis. Mr. Justice White
provided a fixed policy guide---consumer-welfare. Additionally, he
incorporated the principle of change in the Rule of Reason to allow for
improved techniques and changing conditions."
THE EMERGENCE OF THE SPLIT-PERSONALITY OF ANTITRUST
A dichotomy in antitrust policy has developed due mainly to a failure
of the courts to steadfastly adhere to original legislative intent of the
Sherman Act and to the proliferation of confused and confusing antitrust
policies. Beginning with the Clayton Act,12 especially Section 2, the
Robinson-Patman Act, 3 and the Federal Trade Commission Act,' 4
the original emphasis of the Sherman Act, i.e., prevention of monopoli-
zation and restraint of trade in order to maintain open competition for
the benefit of the ultimate consumer, has been supplanted.
Through a series of court decisions, there appeared a discernible shift
in the emphasis of antitrust policy toward the protection of rights and
privileges of competitors, for the alleged purpose of strengthening
competition. Although the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts
were intended to be supplemental to the Sherman Act, these new
Acts directed attention mainly at injury to competitors. This changed
emphasis tended to shift antitrust enforcement after 1914. In United
States Steel, 5 for instance, the defendant's argument that no evidence
pointed to any action that could be construed as detrimental to United
States Steel's competitors was accepted by the Supreme Court majority.' 6
Mr. Justice McKenna in his opinion states: "... there was no evidence
that it (U.S. Steel) attempted to crush its competitors or drive them
10221 U.S. at 63-66 (1911).
1 Bork, supra note 5, at 47.
12 15 U.S.C. §13 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §13c (1936).
13 15 U.S.C. §§13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §13c (1938).
14 15 U.S.C. §45a, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §45a (1960).
'5 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
16 Id. at 447-49.
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from the market."' 17 The Court, in this decision, relied almost entirely
upon the value of protection of competitors and virtually ignored the
value of consumer welfare.
18
The attempt to protect consumer welfare on the one hand, and
competitors on the other, has led antitrust enforcers and the courts into a
never-ending struggle of interpretation. One analyst has said:
The common law rules dealing with restraint of trade and unfair
competitive practices were concerned less with protecting the
consumer than with protecting businessmen from one another. The
antitrust laws sought both ends, finding no incompatibility between
them.19
Suppose a large discounter charges a discriminatory price in a partic-
ular market area; all existing retailers selling competitive merchandise
suffer varying degrees of sales reduction if they fail to meet the lower
price. Under the Robinson-Patman Act, the existing retailers might bring
an antitrust suit against the discounter alleging price discrimination.
20
Yet, under the Sherman Test, the ultimate consumer has been benefited
by the greater variety and lower prices as long as (1) the competitive
structure has not been substantially altered by the entrance of the
discounter, or (2) no predatory or illegal methods were used by
the discounter to gain customers.2'
The incompatible dichotomy of antitrust policy-consumer-welfare
and protection of competitors-has led enforcement agencies and the
courts to confuse these two ends, thus weakening the force of effective
competition. The fact that Congress has created an entirely new Consumer
Protection Agency 2 supports the contention that antitrust enforcers
cannot be guided by two basically contradictory goals. Representative
Erlenborn (R.-Ill.) testified in a hearing on the new consumer agency
that the Federal Trade Commission did in fact have the power and was
originally created by Congress to carry out many functions to be conferred
upon the CPA. But, Representative Erlenborn said, "[I]f the FTC has
been doing the job Congress wanted it to do, we wouldn't be under
pressure to do this (establish a consumer protection agency) today." 23
'7 Id. at 441.
18 See also United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 25-29 (1945); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 148 F. 2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945), for other examples of court opinions emphasizing
values other than consumer welfare.
19A. KAHN, Standards for Antitrust Policy, MONOPOLY POWER AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 172 (E. Mansfield ed. 1968).
20 Robinson-Patman Act, supra note 13.
21 Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 75-6.
22 H.R 10835, passed House of Rep. Oct. 14, 1971, Senate Bill 1177 presently in
Senate Gov't Operations Committee, 92 Cong. 1st Sess. (1971).
23 Washington Report, American Advertising Federation, No. 8, Oct. 15, at 3 (1970).
[Vol. 5:1
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Moreover, in the Nixon Administration's recommendation for major
overhaul of federal regulatory and antitrust units, there is provision for
the creation of a Federal Antitrust Board and a Federal Trade Practices
Agency to take over, respectively, the antitrust and consumer protection
activities; the Federal Practices Agency would take over the remaining
functions of the FTC and administer new consumer protection legislation.
Much of new consumer protection legislation would perhaps be unneces-
sary had antitrust policy always followed the guiding principle of
consumer welfare.
It is impossible to determine beforehand whether an allegedly unfair
elimination of a competitor weakens the vitality of the competitive struc-
ture of an industry. A former respected Assistant Attorney General of the
Antitrust Division, Donald F. Turner, has stated unequivocally that:
The fundamental purpose of the antitrust laws is to encourage
competitive striving. It would be a little paradoxical, to say the least,
to turn on the winner when he wins. If that were regular practice,
one might anticipate some disincentive problems which may reach
serious proportions.
24
At a minimum, this "split-personality" of antitrust policy has
resulted in extreme confusion among both businessmen and enforcers.
And, probably, the desire to protect competitors has resulted in failure
to protect the ultimate consumer's welfare.
Returning to Senator Sherman's views on the policy to be served by
antitrust law, in his own words appearing on the bill he drafted and
reported from the Committee on Finance, he states section 1 of the bill
declares illegal two classes of "arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts,
or combinations"; (1) those "made with a view, or which tend, to prevent
full and free competition," and (2) those "designed, or which tend, to
advance the cost to consumer" of articles of commerce.25 The Sherman
approach clearly indicates the author's desire for courts to be controlled
by the interest of the consumer. Furthermore, the twofold purpose of the
act-to maintain free competition, and prevent monopolistically high
prices-stresses the major economic effects of monopoly.
BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS OF MONOPOLY
The Sherman Act does not find large firm size illegal in itself, but
illegality is found when there is an overwhelming percentage control
of an industry, or when there exists predatory acts or unworthy motives
24 D. Turner, Hearing on Planning, Regulation, and Competition Before the Sub-
committee of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 28
(1967).
2521 Cong. Rec. 1765 (1890) (remarks of Senator J. Sherman).
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by the firm. 26 These are often referred to as the Rule of Reason or
Sherman Tests for misuse of large size or monopoly power discussed
above. There are also a number of per se violations of the Sherman Act
that are considered illegal when discovered. These were announced by
Mr. Justice Peckham in the Trans-Missouri27 case and include any
concerted action to fix prices, divide sales areas, allocate customers, deny
supplies, or limit production. 28 These per se violations are in agreement
with original legislative intent of the Sherman Act since all the above
activities could be interpreted as interfering with consumer welfare.
It is with the Learned Hand decision in United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am. 29 that a dramatic shift occurred in the application of the
Sherman Act to the monopoly situation. Judge Hand found Alcoa
possessed a monopoly in the arbitrarily defined virgin aluminum ingot
market,30 although he recognized that the lower court observing the
identical evidence, employed a different market definition under which
it found Alcoa held only 33 percent of the market. 31
The different methods used in defining the aluminum market are
summarized in formulas below:
Sources of Aluminum Ingot:
(1) open market virgin ingot;
(2) Alcoa's own-use virgin ingot;
(3) secondary or scrap ingot; and
(4) imported virgin and secondary ingot.
( 1) (3) 33peen
Judge Caffey's formula: (1) (3) (4)
(1) (2)Judge Hand's formula: (1) (2) (4) = 90 percenta2
The differences hinge upon Alcoa's own-use production (2 above) and
secondary-scrap production (3 above). Although the lower court excluded
own-use production by Alcoa, Judge Hand maintained that even though
this own-use ingot production never reached the open market, it still had
an effect on it.33 In the case of secondary-ingot production, the lower
court found that aluminum scrap, or secondary ingot, competed with
virgin ingot, and thereby set an upper price limit on the amount Alcoa
26 221 U.S. at 75-76.
27 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1896).
28 Id. at 340-41.
29 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945).
30 Id. at 425.
31 Id. at 424.
32 E. SINGER, ANTrTRUST ECONOMICS: SELECTED LEGAL CASES AND ECONOMIC MODELS
44 (1968).
33 148 F. 2d at 424.
[Vol. 5:1
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could charge for virgin ingot.3 4 Nevertheless, Judge Hand refused to
include secondary ingot in his computation based on the contention
that secondary ingot originally was derived from ingot produced by
Alcoa some time in the past.3
Judge Hand criticized the Rule of Reason and abuse theory of
mergers on the grounds that mere possession of monopoly power, which
he defined as simply the power to manage prices, means that this power
will be exercised in the setting of prices.36 This decision against Alcoa
condemns monopoly without reference to overall market concentration,
abuses, predatory acts, injury to competitors, or intent to monopolize.
Unfortunately, Judge Hand, upon overthrowing the Rule of Reason and
Sherman Tests for monopoly, failed to provide guidelines as to what
percentage of control of output of sales constituted monopoly power.
That is, once Judge Hand placed all emphasis upon the structural test
of the Rule of Reason, then the question becomes one of what percentage
control constitutes monopoly power? Judge Hand offers little more than
the following statement as to a guide for what percentage of control of a
market constitutes monopoly. He states:
That percentage [90 percent of the virgin aluminum ingot market]
is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty
or sixty-four percent would be enough; and certainly thirty-three
percent is not.3
7
Thus, the Alcoa case and the American Tobacco 3 8 case substituted
a new rule of monopoly power for the Sherman Act tests of the Rule of
Reason. These decisions established that the monopoly power condemned
by the Sherman Act is the power to affect price or exclude competitors.
These decisions appear to reject the abuse theory, in which an illegal
attempt to monopolize was inferred from the defendant's predatory
conduct. It was no longer necessary to establish injury resulting from the
misuse of monopoly power; mere possession of monopoly power may
constitute a violation of antitrust law. Thus, the general intent of
the defendant is de-emphasized and the market power becomes the
determining factor.
These new rules and tests, when followed, tend to confuse and
mis-direct antitrust policy. For instance, the Alcoa Test of monopolization
hinges upon the firm's ability to affect price; yet, in imperfectly
competitive markets, all sellers possess this power. As for the ability to
3444 F. Supp. 97, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
35 148 F. 2d at 424-25.
36 Id. at 431-32.
37 Id. at 424.
3 8 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 808-11 (1946).
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exclude competitors, few if any firms possess this power without
governmental enforcement to exclude actual or potential competitors.
Theoretically, size alone does not bestow upon a firm the power to
prevent permanently new entrants in the field. Only if a firm possesses a
monopoly grant from government as for instance with a public utility
license is it assured of no new entrants in its market.
The Alcoa monopolization test and industry structure test relate to
the economic questions involved with defining the relevant product-
market, geographic market, and the impact upon market structure.
DEFINITION OF THE PRODUCT-MARKET
In the Cellophane39 case, the government charged the DuPont
Company with monopolizing commerce in cellophane in violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act. DuPont produced about 75 percent of the
cellophane sold in the United States, which constituted less than 20
percent of the sales of flexible packaging materials. It was necessary for
the government -to establish that the relevant market was cellophane, not
flexible packaging material, to show monopolizing. If the government
failed to convince the court that cellophane was a distinct and separate
product market, then the applicable market would include all related
flexible packaging materials such as aluminum foil, glassine, Saran,
and polyethylene.40
The court used two indicators in determining the relevant product
market, cross-elasticity of demand and reasonable interchangeability of
product.4' Cross-elasticity of demand measures the percentage change in
the quantity demand of, say, cellophane for a very small percentage
change in the price of, say, Saran Wrap, assuming other things remain
equal. This measure cannot be relied upon exclusively to define a relevant
market unless price is the only important economic determinant for the
product. The equation for calculating cross-elasticity of demand measures
only price and quantity; all other factors such as quality and consumer
tastes are not measured directly.
The legal concept of reasonable interchangeability considers other
factors in addition to price, such as quality and type of end-use. Whether
the end user regards the product a substitute for another becomes the
main focus of this analysis.
After consideration of quality and end-use factors, which were
necessarily subjective, Mr. Justice Reed concluded that there was, ". . . a
great sensitivity of customers in the flexible packaging markets to price
39 United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
40 SINGER, supra note 32, at 54.
41351 U.S. at 394,404,
[Vol. 5:1
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 5 [1972], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol5/iss1/3
ANTITRUST LAW
or quality changes," 4 which prevented DuPont from possessing monopoly
power over price. 43 Cellophane was found to have a high degree of
cross-elasticity with other flexible wrapping material.44 The court
concluded, after examination of price, quality, and end-use of cellophane
that a reasonable interchangeability existed between this product and
other flexible wrappings; thus, the government lost its case.4
It was not long before the court ignored the precedent set in the
Cellophane case of a broadened product-market definition. In United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,46 which was an early application of the
Celler-Kefauver Act 47 the court narrowed the definition of the product-
market. The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department attempted to
enjoin acquisition of Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company by Bethlehem
Steel, the sixth and second largest steel producers, respectively. The
government alleged that the proposed merger would violate section 7
of the Clayton Act, because it was reasonably probable that direct
competition between the two competitors would be substantially
lessened. 48 For a violation of the Celler-Kefauver Act, only a reasonable
probability of a substantial lessening of competition or tendency toward
monopoly need be shown by the Government. 49
The court rejected the defendant's argument for a broad product-
market definition that would place steel in the general building materials
market in competition with non-ferrous metals.50 However, buyers of
steel since the early fifties obviously have regarded these other materials
as close substitutes since other building materials have tended to supplant
steel. In addition, the court narrowed the relevant market geographically
to include ". . . the section or sections of the country where the impact of
merger may be manifested .... "-51
Finally, with Brown Shoe,52 the relevant product-market was defined
so narrowly that an acquisition of G. R. Kinney Company which resulted
in the vertical foreclosure of about 2 percent of the retail shoe market was
declared monopolistic. In trying the case, the court selected three issues
for determination: (1) the lines of commerce, or product-market; (2) the
42 United States v. duPont & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 207 (1953).
43 351 U.S. at 400.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 404.
46 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
47 Celler-Kefauver Act, 64 Stat. 1125, 15 U.S.C. §§18, 21 (1950).
48 168 F. Supp. at 595, 618.
49 H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949).
50 168 F. Supp. at 593.
51 Id. at 595, 618.
52 Brown Shop Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 343-46 (1962),
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relevant geographical market; and (3) the impact of the merger upon
competition.5 These issues have become guides in applying both
the Clayton Act (section 7, amended) and the Sherman Act in merger
or monopolization cases.
In defining product-market, courts have tended to continually narrow
the line of commerce within which competition is allegedly restrained.5
The distinguishing feature of a standard commodity, or class of goods, is
reasonable interchangeability of units in the class (being guided by the
purely competitive model). If the principle of indifference between two
products is not operative, the court often considers that there are two
separate markets. It is rare, indeed, when buyers are totally indifferent
between products. They do have a preference, but given a small increase
in the price of their favorite, many will switch to a close substitute.
DEFINITION OF RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC MARKET AND
IMPACT ON MARKET STRUCTURE
The courts and Congress have also narrowed the relevant geographi-
cal market. A Senate report has indicated that by "section of the country,"
it means a self-contained, unitary area in which market forces operate to
determine prices.55 The report further states that a "section of the
country" should be an area "which is largely segregated from, independent
of, or not affected by the trade in that product in other parts of the
country." 56 But a pricing market is not necessarily limited to a particular
geographical area; in fact, it may be national or even international in
scope. For instance, although the price of wheat is determined in the
Chicago Wheat Exchange, changes in world production or consumption
affect the domestic price. This also exists to some extent for oil, steel,
copper, and a whole range of products; perhaps this is so for even
automobiles with foreign car sales accounting for more than 11 percent
of domestic sales. 57
By continually narrowing the definition of product and geographical
market, the final test for the impact of the merger on competition becomes
academic. A narrow definition of product-market assures that the concen-
tration ratio in that market area will always be high, indicating monopoli-
zation. For example, a relevant product-market defined to be grocery
53 Id. at 326.
54 See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), product market
limited to commercial banks in a four-county area alone; See also United States
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
55 S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1950).
56 Id. at 5-6.
57 R. LIENERT, Import Car Penetration Drops to 11.08 Percent, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS,
Nov. 8, 1971, at 1 (article mentions imports reached an all-time high in Aug. 1971 of
21.98% of U.S. car sales).
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stores within the city limits of a two-grocery-store town will result in a
concentration ratio rising to 100 percent if these two stores merged. But,
surely this ignores the realities of the situation. First of all, people are
quite mobile today; thus, if the merged store began to raise prices or limit
services, customers would drive out of town to do their shopping. Second-
ly, the fact that the single merged store was acting as a monopolist would
surely attract other stores seeking to share in the high monopoly profits.
CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION
Conglomerate merger is defined as any merger that is neither
horizontal nor vertical. 58 The source of market power that allegedly
accrues to the conglomerate firm is its supposed ability to shift marketing
emphasis and resources among its markets and activities.59 In an earlier
treatment of conglomerate bigness as a source of power, Corwin Edwards
maintained that the conglomerate firm could not be analyzed in terms of
traditional theory of the firm, which rested on the assumption that firms
maximize profits in each product market. The conglomerate, since it
operates across many markets, Edwards stated, "... need not regard a
particular market as a separate unit for determining business policy and
need not attempt to maximize its profits in the sale of its products.... 
6 0
More recently, Professor Bower offered the opposite hypothesis, that
is, the management of large diversified firms is singularly driven by the
profit motive.61 Since they are not bound by any particular industry
loyalty, they react to a broad range of environmental changes. Therefore,
these managements are alert to profit opportunities wherever they exist.62
Which theory do or should we believe?
Professor Jesse Markham develops a simple mathematical model
which directly tests the market power conglomerates are supposed
to gain, simply by the nature of being a conglomerate. 63 He asks
the question, "Does the conglomerate possess a special advantage due
to the fact that it is operating in completely separate markets?" Professor
Markham concludes:
58A horizontal merger results when two firms join whose products (or services) are
in the same general industry, whereas a vertical merger occurs when two firms join
where the product of one is a component part or input of another firm or product.
59 J. C. NARVER, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND MARKET COMPETITION 114-15 (1969).
60C. EDWARDS, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, BusINEss CONcENTRA-
TION AND PRICE POLICY 331-32 (1955).
61 Bower, Planning Within the Firm, AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW: PAPERS AND
PROCEEDINGS, May (1970).
62 Id. at 193-94.
6 3 Markham, Antitrust and the Conglomerate: A Policy in Search of a Theory,
CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND AcQuISrrIONS: OPINIONS & ANALYSIS, 44 ST. JOHNS
L. REV. 282 (Special Ed. 1970).
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It follows from the foregoing simple mathematical model that a
conglomerate producing totally independent products, under conven-
tional profits maximizing assumptions, will set prices and rates of
output identical with those that would result if each product were
produced by an independent firm."
Markham's results indicate that the conglomerate firm is not in a position
to unfairly subsidize one of its product lines from profits earned on other
products. Conglomerates alone, therefore, raise no unique public policy
issue. It is merely another term for diversification and bestows no
special power on the firm.65
Following a thorough study of the legislative history and impact of
the relationship between firms and conglomerates, John C. Narver arrives
at essentially the same conclusion. He states that, "... the fundamental
conclusion of this analysis is that conglomerate mergers are not inherently
pro-competitive or anti-competitive.66 In analyzing the probable compe-
titive effects of conglomerate mergers, Narver finds that it is never
sufficient to note the existence of a particular magnitude of conglomerate
market power, or that reciprocity has occurred or is possible, or that
there has been a loss of potential competition. "In the abstract," Narver
points out, "none of these has meaning for determining the effect of
the conglomerate merger on competition."'6
Despite this theoretical evidence, the Department of Justice and
the FTC in recent years have moved decisively against conglomerate
mergers of all types. A post-war FTC report listing dangers of the
conglomerate states:
Perhaps the most important danger .. inherent in these conglomerate
organizations is the economic power which they wield over a large
number of different industries. Threatened with competition in
any one of its fields of enterprise, the conglomerate corporation
may sell below cost or may use other unfair methods in that
field, absorbing its losses through excessive profits made in its
other lines of activity."8
The intense concern expressed by FTC with conglomerate mergers and
in mergers in general apparently stems from the belief that increased
concentration is taking place in American industries.
6Id. at 285.
6Id. at 290.
66 NARVER, supra note 59, at 137.
67 Id.
68S. Doc. No. 17, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
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THE FEAR OF ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION
As A GUIDE TO ANTITRUST POLICY
Fear of increased concentration was expressed recently in the report
of the antitrust task force headed by Dean Phil C. Neal, which recom-
mended new legislation supplementing present antitrust statutes. 69 The
purpose of the new statute "would be to give enforcement authorities a
clear mandate to use established techniques of divestiture to reduce
concentration." 70
Statistical studies of overall industry concentration are rare. Most
studies of market concentration deal mainly with concentration in
manufacturing which accounts for less than two-fifths of the income
produced by unregulated private non-financial enterprises. These studies
tell little of the market structure of other sectors which make up the bulk
of our economy which includes the service industries now becoming so
important. A recent analysis of the trend of concentration over the past
60 years was conducted by Morris A. Adelman. Piecing together an
earlier study by G. Warren Nutter of the trend of concentration between
1899 and 1939 with more recent data for 1947, 1954, and 1958, Professor
Adelman concludes that, over the period covered:
... [t]he odds are better than ever that there has actually been
some decline in concentration. It is a good bet that there has
at least been no actual increase; and the odds seem high against
any substantial increase.7'
Professor Adelman's data combined with the earlier Nutter results
appear in Appendix A (Columns 1-5). In addition, an attempt is made
to introduce results of the Census of Business for 1963 and 1966 in
Columns 6 and 7 of Appendix A. These results tend to support the
earlier evidence of little or no increase in average concentration ratios. In
fact, there appears to have been a discernible decline in the total average
concentration ratios since the peak in 1958. Due to possible statistical
error, however, all that can be said for certain is that concentration, even
in the most concentrated area of manufacturing, has not increased.
ANTITRUST APPROACHES IN ATTACKING
CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
Evolution of antitrust actions in regard to conglomerate mergers
has taken the form of complaints and court judgments concerning
69 Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy, TRADE REGULATION REPORTS (Supp. 1,
1969).
70ld. at 415.
71 Hearings on S. Resolution 262 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly, On Economic Concentration, Overall and Conglomerate Aspects. 88th
Cong., 2nd Sess. Part I 287 (1964).
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alleged violations in three specific areas: (1) wealth, (2) potential
competition, and (3) reciprocity.72
The issue in wealth complaints is that as a result of the merger there
is an improved ability of a corporation to deal with the rigors of the
market through a subsidy that the acquired firm could obtain from
the acquiring firm.73 This might take place in either of two different ways;
first through purely financial assistance as would apply to a divergent
conglomerate merger where each firm is engaged in separate markets
and products. Second, through production or marketing advantages in
convergent conglomerate mergers where the two firms, when merged,
could take advantage of the economics of scale of sub-operations by
combining them, as in advertising, use of by-products, or other similarities.
The facts considered in wealth cases usually are: (1) the size
of the acquiring company in relation to the size of the largest
manufacturer in the acquired company's industry; (2) the position of
the acquired company in its industry and the degree of concentration
in that industry; (3) the elimination of competition in that industry;
(4) the position of the acquiring company in its other market; (5) the
nature of the economies enabled by the merger.
74
The theory of the complaints in cases involving potential competition
is displayed in United States v. Penn Olin Chemical Co.75 In this case, the
two firms were competitors in the relevant market, and a merger of
the two would be a violation of the Clayton Act, section 7. In addition,
mergers have been attacked if two firms prior to such merger sold their
products in separate markets and there existed a possibility that one firm
might have entered the acquired firm's market through internal expansion
thus becoming a competitor of the acquired firm.76 Another example is
where the acquired firm might have become a competitor of the acquiring
firm, or where either one might have become a competitor of the other
in a market new to both;T7 there is a lessening of competition through
the elimination of this so-called potential competition.
The potential competition doctrine is still not a concrete one and
has not been applied evenly across the board. Potential competition, as
defined, can take another form, that of a market extension merger. This
72 See cases discussed in text infra.
7 3 Relevant wealth cases are: FEC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 1224 (1967);
Scott Paper Co. v. FTC, 1962 CCH TRADE CASES 70, 271 (1962).
74 NARVER, supra note 59, at 79-88.
75246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965).
76 Proctor & Gamble Co. [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16, 673, at
21, 558 (FTC 1963).
77 United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co. [1963-1965 Transfer Binder], TRADE REG.
REP. 70, 762, at 78, 064 (FTC 1963).
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type would occur when a firm acquires another firm which produces the
same or similar product, but in different markets. This would be a
geographic extension merger similar to a horizontal merger but in a
different market. In this case, there is supposed to exist the possibility
that the two companies might become competitors in the future in
the same market. The most relevant judicial opinion in the potential
competition area is contained in the Foremost Dairy case, 78 which was
decided in the early fifties, and involved geographic diversification.
The FTC held in the Foremost Dairy case that when a large firm
acquires a small independent firm, the other small firms are hurt because
the remaining firms' success depends upon their success in a limited
market while the acquired firm is backed by the large conglomerate. 79
The FTC said, "the resultant disparity in size and type of operation
permits the large conglomerate to strike down its smaller rivals with
relatively little effort or loss in overall profit." 80
In the potential competition field, there exists another contention
that the merger will increase barriers to entry into a market causing
a decrease in the possibility of future potential competitors to develop.
This theory was a factor in FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,8' where it
was feared that barriers to new entrants to the bleach market would
have developed had the merger been allowed.
Reciprocity is the third violation alleged by the antitrust agencies,
wherein a conglomerate may exert certain pressures upon suppliers
who are also potential customers of the conglomerate and such may
tend to lessen competition substantially. Reciprocity occurs when the
acquiring corporation agrees to deal with the acquired corporation.
Reciprocity only becomes important in acquisitions when the acquiring
corporation has sufficient market power or leverage to enforce reciprocity.
The alleged competitive evil of reciprocity is that it will foreclose
competition in the acquired corporation's market by foreclosing certain
markets to its competitors.
The first decision involving reciprocity was FTC v. Consolidated
Foods Corp.82 The Supreme Court determined that as a result of the mer-
ger, there was a probability of reciprocity. The product lent itself to reci-
procity and Consolidated encouraged such practices. Reciprocity was also
at issue in United States v. General Dynamics and Liquid Carbonic Corp.83
78 Foremost Dairies Inc., 60 FTC 944 (1962).
79 Id. at 1083-84.
80 Id. at 1084.
81386 U.S. 1224 (1967).
82380 U.S. 592 (1965).
83246 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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Instead of attempting to treat conglomerate mergers, separately and
distinctly, as if conglomerateness or diversification imparts additional
market power, perhaps the Government should concentrate on the
traditional Clayton, section 7, approach. That is, the Government
should examine the evidence in the proposed merger for an indication
of a reasonable probability of substantial lessening of competition or
tendency toward monopoly.
SOME MODEST RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ANTITRUST POLICY
As is often the case, criticisms for a particular governmental policy
are vehement and plentiful; however, when it comes to suggestions for
improvements, silence greets the inquirer. The recommendations that
follow are based upon several simple guidelines. First, all rules for public
conduct-which is what the antitrust laws are-should meet the following
criteria as best as possible: clarity of statement; equality in application;
and impartiality in enforcement. Unfortunately, the present structure of
antitrust laws and policy seem to "violate" practically every criterion
listed above.
The first suggestion is that at a minimum, most, if not all, laws
exempting industries and activities from direct application of antitrust
laws should be repealed.84 Specific exemptions from the antitrust laws
have been provided for a long list of industries and activities including
all public transportation, communication, most agricultural marketing,
and to some extent insurance companies.
The exemption to labor unions perhaps should be handled differently,
since they were specifically granted monopoly bargaining by federal law
in the first place (The Wagner Act).8 It seems illogical to attack labor
unions for utilizing their monopoly position to extract economic gains
for their membership. If it is felt that unions generally are abusng their
monopoly position, this would suggest revisions in the original laws
granting them this special power. Labor unions still are subject to
antitrust if they combine or conspire with an employer group to injure
trade or fix product prices.86
Appendix B lists the major exemptions to antitrust and the laws that
grant these specific exceptions. It will be noted that these can be grouped
according to special circumstances. Group A are all related in one way or
another to the Great Depression. Farmers entered the Depression more
than a decade before the rest of the economy, which explains their
8 4 Appendix B, infra lists the major exemptions from antitrust and the laws that
grant these exemptions.
85National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. §159 (1935).
s 15 U.S.C. §13 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § (1936).
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exemptions dating from 1914 and 1922. The conditions under which most,
if not all, of these exemptions to antitrust were granted have long since
ceased to exist. Group B are all associated with war-related conditions
or alleged special circumstances requiring regulatory prerogatives.
Generally, during wartime conditions defense industries are granted
exemptions from antitrust. The danger lies in the fact that collusive
agreements forged during wartime may carry over into peacetime. Also,
tremendous government purchases and outright aid to defense industries
encourage the growth of a giant military-industrial complex with vested
interests in its own survival.
THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES--LEGALIZED CARTELS
The President's Council of Economic Advisors, the head of the
Justice Department's Antitrust Division, and the Advisory Council on
Executive Reorganization are unanimous in their criticism of the present
methods of regulating surface transportation.87 Under the laws establishing
various regulatory commissions for public transportation, exemptions
from antitrust were granted. The essence of the Reed-Bulwinkle Act,
amending the Interstate Commerce Act,88 is that agreements on rates
made by railroads, or inland waterway carriers subject to the Interstate
Commerce Commission 89 are relieved from operation of antitrust laws
whenever their practices are approved by the ICC.90
The Transportation Act 9' converted the ICC into an operator of a
national transportation cartel. Under ICC regulations, different rates are
approved for commodities despite there being no difference in the service
offered or the costs of transportation. Moreover, the ICC limits the
number of firms allowed to engage in particular modes of common carrier
transportation.92 It actually maintains a price umbrella for truckers, barge
lines, coastal steamship operators and railroads.9 3 For the other transport
regulators, the Civil Aeronautics Board sets minimum air cargo rates and
passenger flight rates. It even attempts to regulate the types of services
provided at rates to prevent one airline from offering a better service than
another.94 The Federal Maritime Board forces United States steamship
87 See Council of Economic Advisers Joins Ranks of those Assailing Transport
Regulation, The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 2, 1971, at 2, col. 3.
88 Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
89 Hereinafter cited as ICC.
90 V. A. Mun- & R. H. WOLD, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC PoLIcY 326(1971).
91 Transportation Act (Each-Cununins Act), 41 Stat. 456, 49 U.S.C. §15-a (1887).
92 Id. at §20-a.
93 Hilton, Barriers to Competitive Rate Making, 29 ICC PtAc. J. 1083 (1962).
94 Civil Aeronautics Act, Appendix B note 7 infra.
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lines into Oceanic Conferences, which are privately operated international
cartels that set ocean freight rates and attempt to prevent rate cutting.9
In the Economic Report of the President, the Council of Economic
Advisors maintains that regulation results in high freight rates, yet causes
financial losses for some carriers.9 6 Furthermore, the Council states that
regulation leads to inefficient use of the nation's resources, such as locating
businesses and factories near congested urban areas to avoid the high costs
of shipping finished products.97 The Council recommends gradual
deregulation for transport industries.98 At first, carriers could be given
freedom to set rates within a narrow band above and below present
set rates, with the band later widened. Market entry could be progressively
freed, allowing for greater inter-competition between carriers themselves.
Next, restrictions against carriers leaving unprofitable markets could
gradually be removed. And, most important, transportation companies
would become subject to antitrust laws.
The Chief of the Antitrust Division, Richard W. McLaren, recom-
mended that:
... [A]fter a suitable period in which regulations are phased out,
surface transportation should operate like any other business.
Competition should be allowed to determine the price, quality and
availability of transportation services.99
In addition, the antitrust chief recommended Congress repeal antitrust
exemptions enjoyed by regulated transport companies in rate-fixing and
certain other areas.
ICC regulation of public carriers was born with regulation of the
railroads over 84 years ago when railroads possessed a virtual monopoly
on overland public transportation.1°° As new modes of transportation came
on the scene, Congress, instead of deregulating railroads, chose to extend
regulations to each new mode. Whatever economic justification originally
existed for transport industry regulation has tended to disappear with the
proliferation of competing means of transportation available today.
The Advisory Council on Executive Organization advocates
combining the ICC, Civil Aeronautics Board, and Federal Maritime
Commission into a unified Transportation Regulatory Agency with a
single administrator.' 0'
95 54 Stat. 898 (1940).
96 Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report o1 the President, 123-24 (1971).
97 Id. at 127.
98 Id. at 126.
99 Antitrust Chief Lashes ICC, Urges an End of Regulation Over Mass Transportation,
The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 29, 1971, at 5, col. 2.
100 Transportation Act (Each-Cumrnins Act), 41 Stat. 456, 49 U.S.C. §15-a (1887).
101 Id.
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REPEAL OF SPECIAL INTEREST REGULATION
In addition to removing antitrust exemptions from numerous
activities and industries, several pieces of special interest legislation
are candidates for repeal. Antitrust laws have always been vigorously
applied to strike down price fixing among distributors and manufacturers.
Resale price maintenance laws make it possible for a manufacturer or
distributor of products bearing a trademark, brand, or producer's name,
to fix by contract the minimum or actual wholesale and retail price.
These contracts would be held illegal per se under section 1 of
the Sherman Act and section 5 of the FTC Act in the absence of the
Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts (Appendix B, Item 5).
The original Miller-Tydings Act 10 2 was another piece of Great
Depression special interest legislation which was supposedly passed
to benefit the small retailer and wholesaler interested in restricting price
competition at the retail level. 03 However, it has been used most success-
fully by large manufacturers of brand-name products that are highly
advertised, non-perishable, and widely distributed. Much of the important
litigation has involved large liquor distillers. 1°4
Manufacturers of brand-name products have been interested in resale
price maintenance to maintain price identity and generous margins for
wholesalers in order to hopefully assure wide distribution for their
products. It also serves as a means of preventing price chiseling at
the retail level.1'5
Suits to eliminate the "non-signers" clause, which obligates all
retailers or wholesalers in a state once a single price maintenance contract
is signed, resulted in a powerful lobby which gained passage of the federal
McGuire Act.10 6 Since 1953, a growing number of state fair trade statutes
have been weakened or invalidated by their respective state courts, which
leaves only 21 states with fully operative price-maintenance laws.107 The
Michigan Supreme Court, for instance, stated that the process of reducing
prices by competition does not bring evils to the general welfare. 08
Both the Miller-Tydings and the McGuire Acts should be repealed
by Congress as blatant attempts to secure the privilege to fix prices at
the wholesale and retail levels by certain branded products.
102 Miller-Tydings Act (Fair Trade Act) 50 Stat. 693, 15 U.S.C. §1 (1937).
103 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON RESALE PRICE MAnrTENANCE,
LXI (1945).
1o4 Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
105 F. JONES, RETAIL MERCHANDISING 391 (1957).
106 341 U.S. 384.
107 V. A. MuND and K. H. WOLF, supra note 90, at 196.
108 Id. at 197.
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Another special interest law passed during the Great Depression
is the Robinson-Patman Act, which amends section 2 of the Clayton Act
relating to price discrimination. The Robinson-Patman Act, often referred
to as the anti-chainstore law, completely revised the original price
discrimination section of the Clayton Act. The idea was to protect the
independent wholesaler and retailer faced with increasing competition
from chain stores and other mass distributors.
The chain store and grocery chain are nothing more than marketing
innovations to provide greater efficiency, variety and convenience in
distributing a whole range of products to the ultimate consumer. Its
demonstrated superiority is attested to by the fact that the concept has
spread throughout the wesern world.
The Robinson-Patman Act: (1) prohibits price discriminations which
have -the effect of substantially lessening competition or tending to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce or the effect of injuring, destroying,
or preventing competition either with persons who grant or knowingly
receive the benefits of such discrimination; 0 9 but the law (2) allows price
discriminations to be made "in good faith to meet the equally low price of
a competitor";" 0 (3) prohibits brokerage payments to buyers outright;-
(4) prohibits advertising or sales allowances not made "on proportionately
equal terms" to all purchasers;.2 and, (5) prohibits buyers from
knowingly receiving or inducing such price discriminations."' The
language of the act leaves a broad area of interpretation by the courts.
Briefly, the law condemns both primary-line (same line of commerce
as accused seller) and secondary-line (line of commerce in which seller's
customers are engaged) discrimination. All that the party alleging
damages needs to demonstrate is (1) that he was discriminated against
in terms of price and (2) he suffered injury; that is, he lost some business
as a result of alleged price discrimination.
Under the Robinson-Patman amendment to the Clayton Act (section
2), the burden of proof is shifted to the defendant by the alleged act
of price discrimination being made prima facie illegal. One economist,
upon closely examining the record of unfair competiton and price
dscrimination, observed that most alleged instances:
... [H]ave usually turned out to be the efforts of a seller to
popularize a new product, to cut cost by lining up orders in advance
109Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §2(a) (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §2(a)
(1936).
nOld. at §2b.
"' Id. at §2c.
"'2Id. at §2d.
"Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§13, 13(a), 13(b), 21(a) (1936), as amended,
15 U.S.C. §13(c) (1938).
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of production, or to maintain different prices in different markets in
order to increase profit-'
4
By attempting to legislate against price discrimination, there is always
the risk of condemning normal and necessary price competition. Some
economists feel that many trade practices condemned as predatory or
exclusionary are really indispensable features of the process of
competition itself31
In light of the confused nature of the law, the lack of positive results
from antitrust enforcement, and the danger of attacking legitimate price
competition, the Robinson-Patman Act should be repealed by Congress.
The original reasons for its passage have long since failed to be relevant.
Today, independent stores compete aggressively alongside not only chain
stores, but also discount houses. Each offers a slightly different service
to customers-the small independent store offers convenience, personal
attention and often, additional store hours.
,ONCLUSION-NEED FOR CLARITY, EQUALITY, AND
'MPARTIALITY IN ANTITRUST POLICY
Antitrust policy has been found to provide less than a crystal-clear
,uide to business practices. The basic difficulty is the failure of Congress,
Antitrust enforcers, and the courts to steadfastly adhere to the goal of
protection of consumer welfare. The legislative intent behind the Sherman
Act, as well as the recognized purpose of antitrust policy in general is:
(1) prevention of restraint of trade and the exercise of monopoly
power; (2) maintenance of full and open competition; and, (3) attack
of all practices that result in higher costs to the consumer of articles of
commerce
n 6
Development of the dichotomy of goals-attempting to protect
competitors as well as consumers-has contributed to an apparent loss
of emphasis and confusion in antitrust policy. The proliferation of
exemptions to antitrust laws has tended to blunt their effectiveness, and
spread confusion and disrespect for the laws.
Two economic errors of antitrust policy are discussed in this article.
The first is the misinterpretation of unfair competition by the Federal
Trade Commission. Instead of adhering to the concept of protecting
consumer welfare, the FTC has forbidden certain business practices
long before they injured consumers, or even competitors. The effect of
this policy of attacking competitive practices of aggressive growth firms
under the pretense that their activities may result in monopolization
114 Dewey, supra note 1, at 19.
n5 Id.
116 Text supra at 70.
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or potential harm to competitors may result in making the position of
the largest sellers safer from competition.
Another economic error in antitrust policy is the trend toward
attacking practically any merger in what is defined as an oligopoly
industry (product-market where any four or fewer firms' market share
exceeds 70 percent).117 Courts have contributed to the error by continually
narrowing the definition of the product-market and relevant section of the
country, which tends to raise any measure of concentration to indicate
higher levels of concentration than would otherwise have been the case.
This indiscriminate attack on all mergers in oligopoly industries is
apparently based upon the belief that overall concentration is increasing
over time. Unfortunately, empirical evidence fails to support this
contention-evidence of the trends in overall concentration is inconclusive
but it does not show a significant increase. Antitrust opposition to
conglomerate mergers as if they were an evil is illogical and without
theoretical or empirical support. Since no study has yet demonstrated that
mergers generally or conglomerate mergers specifically, are wrong or
anti-competitive in themselves, it seems ill-advised for antitrust to attack
every merger above a certain size or involving an oligopoly industry
simply because some arbitrarily defined concentration ratio rises.
All too often Americans believe solutions to problems can be found
only by passing a new law. But, causes of the present antitrust jungle
appear to be too many conflicting laws whose interpretation by antitrust
officials and the courts has tended to contribute to the overall confusion.
Suggested changes in emphasis and repeals recommended here are not
intended to weaken but instead to strengthen antitrust policy. The
antitrust laws cannot be guides to good business behavior if the rules
are ambiguous and are applied capriciously to some, while entire
industries or activities are exempt from the laws.
117 TRADE REGULATION REPORTS, supra note 69.
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Appendix A
Average Concentration Ratios*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
INDUSTRY GROUP
Food and kindred products
Tobacco manufacturers . . .
Textile mill products ; .
Apparel and related products
Lumber and wood products
Furniture and fixtures ....
Pulp, paper and products . . .
Printing and publishing . . .
Chemicals and related products
Petroleum and coal products
Rubber products .....
Leather and leather products
Stone, clay and glass products
Primary metal products . . .
Fabricated metal products
Machinery, except electrical
Electrical machinery ....
Transportation equipment . .
Instruments and related products
Miscellaneous manufacturers
TOTAL, ALL INDUSTRIES
PERCENT OF
VALUE ADDED
IN INDUSTRIES
WITH
CONCENTRATION
OVER 50
1901 1947
• 39.1 18.8
. 49.9 77.7
* 20.3 9.0
2.2
• .5 2.0
* 8.1
* 71.0 1.6
* 1.0 0.0
24.3 33.7
46.8 13.6
100.0 59.9
. 26.3 0.0
13.3 43.9
• 45.7 21.0
* 8.4
* 41.4 18.5
* 53.2
* 57.3 84.2
45.0
. 2.7 21.2
* 32.9 24.0
AVERAGE CONCENTRATIONt
1947 1954 1958 1963t 1966t
34.9 33.8 32.6 33.7 34.8
76.2 73.4 74.1 74.6 75.0
24.3 26.5 29.2 32.7 33.9
12.6 13.0 13.4 16.5 18.1
11.2 10.8 12.8 14.9 15.8
21.9 20.3 19.0 16.9 18.0
21.2 24.8 25.9 30.2 29.7
19.7 17.7 17.6 18.6 17.4
51.0 48.6 45.7 43.9 42.7
39.5 36.6 31.6 33.9 32.0
58.6 54.1 51.3 34.9 33.1
26.2 26.4 25.0 23.3 24.3
43.4 46.4 40.3 37.2 38.3
43.8 49.5 46.8 41.5 40.2
25.3 26.1 25.5 24.3 23.3
38.0 33.2 35.5 33.9 33.0
54.1 48.2 46.9 44.7 46.4
54.4 58.7 61.3 62.0 61.5
45.3 47.4 47.8 46.3 49.6
34.9 16.1 22.6 27.6 27.6
35.3 36.9 37.0 35.8 34.0
Source: Morris A. Adelman, Changes in Industrial Concentration, MONOPOLY
POWER AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, 79 (Edwin Mansfield ed. 1968).
* Note:
For each 4-digit industry (i.e., canned fruits and vegetables) included in a 2-digit
major industry group (i.e., Food and Kindred Products), a concentration ratio was
computed showing the percent of sales accounted for by the four largest firms in the
industry. The weighing factor of each 4-digit industry was its value added (difference
between purchases and sales), which measures its own contribution to national
product. Each 4-digit industry's concentration ratio was multiplied by its weighing
factor (shown in Columns 3-7), and all results total.
$ Data for 1947, 1954, and 1958. Adelman, supra.
t Data for 1963 and 1966 compiled by author from: U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Annual Survey of Manufacturers: 1966, Concentration Ratios, 415-441 (1968).
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Appendix B
Exemptions of Particular Industries and
Activities from Antitrust Laws
Industry or Activity (Date)
Labor Unions (1914) and Later judicial decisions
GROUP A-GREAT DEPRESSION:
I. Agricultural Product Handlers (1937)
2. Agricultural Cooperatives (1914 and 1922)
3. Aquatic Product Associations (1934)
4. Mfrs. and Handlers-
Hog Cholera Serum (1935)
5. Resale Price Maintenance (1937)
6. Air Carriers (1938)
GROUP B-WAR AND! OR REGULATORY:
7. Water carriers in foreign and
domestic commerce (1916)
8. Business Assns. in export trade (1918)
9. Telegraph Companies (1943)
10. Railroads and other surface carriers (1948)
11. Defense Industries in time of war (1950)
12. Insurance Companies (1945)
Law or Laws
Providing Exemption
Clayton Act, Section 6
1. Agr. Mkt. Agreement Act1
2. Capper-Volstead Act 2
3. Fishermen's Cooperative
Mkt. Act 3
4. Agr. Adjustment Act., Sec. 574
5. Miller-Tydings Act5 and
McGuire Act (1952) 6
6. Civil Aeronautics Act 7
7. Shipping Act (amended) 8
8. Webb-Pomerene Act 9
9. Fed. Communications Act 10
10. Reed-Bulwinkle Act 11
11. Defense Production Act(1950) 12 and Small Bus.
Mobilization Act (1942) 13
12. McCarran Act 14
'Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 246, 7 U.S.C. §608(b)
(1937)
2Agricultural Producers' Associations Act (Capper-Volstead Act), 42 Stat. 388, 7
U.S.C. §§291, 292 (1922).
3 Fishermen's Collective Marketing Act, 48 Stat. 1213, 15 U.S.C. §§521, 522 (1934).
4 Agricultural Adjustment Act, 48 Stat. 31, 7 U.S.C. §§601-605, 607-623 (1933).
5 Fair Trade Act (Miller-Tyding's Act), 50 Stat. 693, 15 U.S.C. §1 (1937).
6 Fair Trade Act (McGuire Act), 66 Stat. 632, 15 U.S.C. §45 (1952).
7 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973, 49 U.S.C. §§1301-1542 (1938).
8 Shipping Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 728, 46 U.S.C. §§801-842 (1916), as amended, 62
Stat. 212, 46 U.S.C. §838 (1948).
9 Export Trade Act (Webb-Pomerene Act), 40 Stat. 517, 15 U.S.C. §§61-65 (1918).
10 Communications Act of 1943, 57 Stat. 5, 47 U.S.C. §§214, 222 (1943).
1 Carriers' Rate Bureau Act (Reed-Bullwinkle Act), 62 Stat. 472, 49 U.S.C. §5
(1948).
12 Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. §2158 (1950).
13 Small Business Mobilization Law, 56 Stat. 351 (1942).
14 McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act, 50 Stat. 33, 15 U.S.C. §§1011 et seq.
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